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Industry Specialization and Auditor Quality in U.S. Markets 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates the relation between audit quality, auditor industry market share, and 
audit fees. Prior literature has asserted that audit providers with high market shares can be 
designated as industry specialists and that the fee premiums that sometimes attach to these 
auditors is evidence of a quality differentiated audit product. Using data from the U.S. audit 
market for the fiscal year 2003 we extend this literature by investigating the relationships 
among audit fee premiums, auditor market shares, and two dimensions of audit quality: 
external reporting and economies of scope in providing joint audit and non-audit services. 
We find little evidence to support the conjecture that high market share auditors provide 
increased audit quality. Further, we find that most auditors with high market shares do not 
seem to charge a fee premium. To the contrary, we report that the high market share fee 
premiums found in pooled (across industry) tests are primarily attributable to a small set of 
industries in which the high market share (specialist) auditor has a dominant position. This 
leads us to conclude that the available evidence is more supportive of the hypothesis that 
high-market share firms are extracting rents than the hypothesis that these auditors are 






















1. Introduction and Literature Review 
 
 This study investigates the relation between auditor industry specialization, audit fees, 
and quality differentiation using data from the U.S. audit market for the fiscal year 2003. We 
extend prior research on auditor specialization (Pearson and Trompeter 1994; Craswell 
Francis and Taylor 1995; Hogan and Jeter 1999; Gramling and Stone 2001; Fergusen and 
Stokes 2002; Casterella et al 2004; Francis, Reichelt, and Wang 2005; among others) by 
distinguishing the various industry specialization and pricing strategies available to auditors 
and the implications of those strategies. Further, we delve into the use of auditor market 
share as a proxy for specialization by considering the associations among market share, 
auditor pricing strategies, and audit quality.  
Recent empirical literature has assumed that auditor market shares identify industry 
specialists and relies upon that identification to explore the association between audit fees 
and industry specialization.1 This leads to a generic empirical model used to test for an 
industry specialist fee premium:  
 Fee = b0 + bk • controls + bk+1• I       (1) 
where, Fee is the natural log of audit fees, controls is a vector of various audit and client 
characteristics found to determine audit fees, and I is an indicator variable for the presence of 
an industry specialist auditor. In the literature I is often defined as: 
 I = 1 if industry market share > x and 0, otherwise     (2) 
with x a fixed and usually ad hoc number such as 20% or 25%. Craswell, Francis, and Taylor 
(1995) (CFT hereafter), for instance, report a positive relation between audit fees and this 
                                                 
1 We are using the term identification in the econometric sense whereby an observed proxy variable, market 
share, is used to represent an unobserved latent variable, specialization. If market share is highly correlated with 
the auditor specialization and uncorrelated with other factors then the estimated coefficient on market share 
identifies the effect of specialization on the response variable, typically audit fees. 
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market share based specialization proxy in Australia. Consistent with the theory of 
monopolistic competition a positive association (indicated by bk+1 > 0) was interpreted as 
evidence that industry specialist auditors provide higher quality audits than non-specialist 
auditors. Further, Balsam et al (2003) find evidence that clients of specialist auditors exhibit 
lower discretionary accruals, and higher earnings response coefficients.2 However, other 
studies have questioned the generality of the CFT finding. For example, Ferguson and Stokes 
(2002) also using Australian data but for time periods subsequent to those in CFT do not find 
an association between specialization and audit fees. 
Our paper contributes to this literature by investigating the identification of specialist 
auditors through the use of industry market shares. We also call into question the 
interpretation of the association between market share based measures of specialists and audit 
fee premiums as evidence of quality differentiation.  
Guided by the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm in industrial 
organization (see Gramling and Stone 2001 for an overview of this approach in auditing), 
empirical auditing researchers have concerned themselves with how the structure of auditing 
markets influences the strategic conduct of auditing firms3. In this framework, structure 
refers to the micro-economic elements of accounting firms (such as their cost functions) and 
conduct refers to how firms compete in auditing markets. Within the present context the SCP 
framework naturally leads to two questions of particular interest to auditing researchers. The 
                                                 
2 An important distinction between the tests in Balsam et al (2003) and our study is that we utilize audit fees and 
pricing models to distinguish auditor specialists. In contrast, Balsam et al rely on client characteristics as 
proxies for auditor industry specialization. 
3 Auditing firms are organized as partnerships or limited liability corporations. Consequently, information on 
audit firm profitability is not publicly available and the performance element of the SCP model has not been 
studied in the empirical auditing literature. 
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first question is: What is the form of auditor specialization (structure)? The second question 
is: How does the form of specialization affect competition in audit markets (conduct)?  
CFT address these issues by arguing that in response to client demand, specialist 
auditors make investments in industry-specific auditing technologies. These investments 
allow specialist auditors to provide differentiated products and price their services 
accordingly. Continuing this line of reasoning a straightforward empirical test is to identify 
auditors with investments in industry-specific audit technology and compare their fees and 
audit quality with those of auditors not making industry-specific investments. Unfortunately, 
auditor investment decisions are not readily observable by researchers. Therefore, a less 
direct approach is required. CFT conjectured that auditors with high market shares within a 
given industry could be designated as specialists.4 They then tested whether these designated 
specialists received a fee premium, i.e., bk+1 > 0, in equation (1) above. A priori, this test is 
valid under the maintained hypotheses that the function I(•) correctly identifies audit 
specialists and that specialists provide a quality differentiated product. 
However, the interpretation of bk+1> 0 as confirming evidence for the maintained 
hypotheses is weakened if the market share based specialist measure, I(•), is related to any 
other auditor characteristic that influences the audit fee. For example, a long established 
result in economic theory - going back to at least Lerner (1934) - relates a firm’s market 
share to the extent of its monopoly power in a market. The market power explanation is 
consistent both with cases in which market power is due to product differentiation and also to 
cases where market power derives from other sources such as barriers to entry, non-industry 
specific economies of scale, switching costs, etc. Importantly, these alternative sources of 
                                                 
4 Implicit in this conjecture is the assumption that there is greater demand for high quality audits than there is 
for lower quality audits. Of course, it is assumed that all audits supplied in the market meet minimum GAAS 
standards in expectation. 
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market power do not allow the coefficient of bk+1 to be uniquely interpreted as evidence of 
product differentiation and industry-specialization.  
In this paper we refine the tests of the specialist product differentiation hypothesis by 
broadening the definition of audit quality and categorizing specialists, defined by I(market 
share ≥ x%), into those for whom bk+1 > 0, labeled product differentiators (premium 
auditors), and those for whom bk+1 ≤ 0, labeled cost leaders. This labeling recognizes that two 
forms of specialization strategies are possible and that a price premium in conjunction with 
large market share is insufficient to identify an auditor as a product differentiator. 
To further aid in identification we follow Balsam et al (2003) in applying direct 
evidence of audit quality to distinguish between the alternative explanations for finding a 
specialist auditor premium. Our proposed measures of audit quality build upon the insights of 
Hotelling (1929) and Schmalensee (1979) who note that products, in general, may be 
horizontally or vertically differentiated.5 Simunic (1980) and Simunic and Stein (1987) state 
that audits may differ vertically on external audit and internal audit quality dimensions, and 
horizontally when auditors offer a variety of services such as tax and advisory services in 
addition to audits. We adopt their classification scheme in our empirical tests of audit quality 
across auditor types by including non audit fees as a measure of horizontal differentiation. 
Consistent with economic theory we argue that specialization is characterized by the 
auditor’s cost function. The cost function, if observed, would reveal the type of industry-
specific investments made by the auditor. As suggested above, we follow along the lines 
proposed by Porter (1980) and conjecture that these investments could implement either a 
product differentiation strategy or take the form of process improvements. This latter type of 
                                                 
5 A product is horizontally differentiated when it has multiple characteristics and consumers vary in their 
preferences over these characteristics. In contrast, vertical differentiation refers to a single product characteristic 
where, conditional on price, all consumers prefer more to less of that characteristic. 
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investment is directed at increasing audit efficiency and is consistent with a cost leadership 
strategy. Since auditor cost functions are not observed with the available data we look to 
economic theory and market conditions to infer individual auditor specialization strategies.  
Having assembled the constituent elements of our research we now summarize the 
general empirical framework applied in this paper. As is typical of the existing literature, 
auditors with high industry market shares are conjectured to be industry specialists. But, 
contrary to the literature, we allow specialists to either differentiate their product or seek cost 
advantages. We then test whether specialist auditors that receive a fee premium provide 
higher quality audits measured on multiple quality dimensions. These tests provide direct 
evidence on a number of unresolved issues. First, is market share a valid proxy for industry 
specialization? For this to be true, the evidence should indicate an association between 
market share and product quality or market share and cost leadership. Second, do all 
specialist auditors adopt a product differentiation strategy? Here we are looking for evidence 
of a consistent across-industry association between specialization status and audit quality. 
Finally, do specialist related fee premia indicate higher audit quality or monopoly pricing?6 
The evidence related to this question looks at the association of market share driven fee 
premia with audit quality.  
Briefly, our empirical findings are that in pooled (29 two-digit SIC industries) cross-
sectional regressions there is some weak evidence that auditors with market shares in excess 
of 20% in a given industry earn a fee premium (about 14%) relative to a comprehensive set 
of other auditors. However, contrary to the industry specialization hypothesis, we do not find 
                                                 
6 If specialist fee premia are correlated with higher quality audits then it can be argued that specialization 
benefits both the providers and consumers of audits. In contrast, if there is no correlation between fee premia 





evidence that these designated specialist auditors provide higher quality audits than other Big 
4 auditors. Further, we find that the specialist fee premium is reduced to 7.1% when the 
sample is restricted to the clients of Big 4 auditors. A further reduction of the fee premium to 
5.0% is found when two industries with dominant auditors are excluded from the sample. 
 In additional tests we separately include indicators for each Big 4 auditor and 
estimate industry-specific fee models.  Consistent with our conjecture that different pricing 
and investment strategies are available to auditors we find cases in which auditors receive a 
statistically significant fee premium and cases where auditors have statistically significant fee 
discounts. However, we do not find consistent and convincing evidence of quality 
differentiation between these auditors and other Big 4 providers. Specifically, we examine 
whether auditor industry market share predicts accruals quality, absolute discretionary 
accruals, or restatements. Once again we find little evidence to support the conjecture that 
high market share auditors (specialists) provide higher quality audits within the Big 4. We 
do, however, find some evidence that auditors with high market shares earn greater non-audit 
service fees. 
Taken together, our results do not support the use of market share as a proxy for 
industry specialization. Rather, we interpret our findings to be more consistent with the 
alternative hypothesis, and more traditional economic interpretation, of market share as a 
proxy for market power. 
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we develop the 
hypotheses. Section 3 provides a description of the data selection and variable measurement. 




2. Hypothesis Development 
Economic theory predicts that demand for higher quality products results in a positive 
relation between quality and price. An extensive literature, starting with Simunic (1980) and 
DeAngelo (1981) finds evidence that Big N (larger) auditors provide higher quality audits 
than Non-Big N (smaller) auditors in national or international markets. Recent literature has 
applied this theory to the demand for quality, defining markets by industry (Craswell et al 
1995) and by city (office) within industries (Defond et al 2000; Ferguson et al 2003; Francis, 
Reichelt, and Wang 2005). This narrowing of the definition of an audit market has allowed 
for the examination of audit quality heterogeneity across markets and the effects of auditor 
specialization within a given market.  
Despite the narrowing definition of audit markets, auditor specialization and pricing 
strategies are not normally observable by researchers. As a consequence, researchers have 
relied on a combination of economic reasoning and a priori assumptions to overcome data 
limitations. Of relevance to this study is the identification of specialist auditors by the 
application of a minimum threshold level of market share within an industry as represented 
by equation (2) (see for example Craswell et al 1995; Ferguson and Stokes 2002; Balsam et 
al 2003). However, we argue that the use of a market share proxy for specialization is subject 
to significant limitations since economic arguments can be made for a supplier gaining 
market share either by providing a differentiated product or discounting the price of a non-
differentiated product. Without imposing additional structure we do not believe that a 
positive association between market share and price can be uniquely attributed to a product 
differentiation strategy. CFT argue that client demand for industry specialization drives audit 
firm investments in industry-specific accounting technologies. However, it is not necessary 
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that all suppliers choose the same type of investment and subsequent dominant pricing 
strategy.  
As suggested above, a primary motivation for this study is the concern that the 
current empirical research on auditor specialization cannot distinguish between the 
alternative explanations for the result that bk+1 > 0 in equation (1). The contending 
explanations are: a) the specialist provides a quality differentiated audit; or b) the high 
market share auditor exerts market power. The existence of these empirically 
indistinguishable alternatives is problematic since the social welfare and regulatory 
implications of these explanations lie in stark contrast to one another. Further, the conclusion 
that a fee premium validates the conjectured relationship between specialization and market 
share is true only if the set of auditor strategies is limited to providing either a differentiated 
or generic product. Once oligopolistic behavior is admitted as a strategy, as is at least 
plausible in markets with a limited number of suppliers, then the finding that bk+1 > 0 is 
insufficient to identify a high market share provider as a quality differentiated specialist. In 
logical terms, the model is under-specified since there are three possible auditor strategies 
(generic provider, quality differentiated provider, and oligopolistic provider) but only two 
outcomes of the experimental variable,  bk+1 > 0 or bk+1 ≤ 0.  
 In addition to this unresolved identification issue we believe the literature has 
neglected the fundamentals of strategic analysis as proposed by Porter (1980). Explanation a) 
above assumes that specialist auditors consistently choose to differentiate their product. 
However, another generic strategy is for auditors to pursue a cost leadership (efficiency) 
strategy. Since both strategies require an investment in knowledge capital we argue that 
auditors selecting either strategy are appropriately labeled as specialists. Importantly, we are 
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unaware of any theoretical considerations that suggest market share, per se, aligns more 
naturally with the product differentiation strategy than the cost leadership strategy. In turn, to 
the extent that market share does identify specialist auditors it seems to us to be equally 
likely that either generic strategy applies. Of course, we also know of no reason why either 
strategy could not result in a particular auditor in a given industry having a relatively small 
market share.  
 Recapping the preceding paragraphs we argued that the industry specialization model 
formulated in equations (1) and (2) suffers from several distinct identification deficiencies 
that impedes upon our ability to interpret the coefficient, bk+1. They are: 
i) The model cannot distinguish between quality differentiation and pure rent-
 seeking behavior by the use of the market share proxy alone; 
ii) Specialist auditors with large market shares could be characterized by either a 
 product differentiation or a cost leadership strategy.  If the latter then the 
 implication is that bk+1 ≤ 0 rather than bk+1 > 0; and 
iii) Specialist auditors using either strategy may not obtain a large market share, 
 thereby introducing measurement error into the tests.  
An obvious way to address these identification issues is to use audit quality measures 
in conjunction with the pricing model. Earlier we noted two types of non-exclusive 
differentiation strategies: horizontal and vertical differentiation. Simunic (1980) and Simunic 
and Stein (1987) provide an example of horizontal differentiation stating that audit quality 
may consist of three components: the level of assurance provided on financial reports 
(external reporting quality), the ability to contribute to the reliability of the client’s internal 
control systems (internal reporting quality), and the joint production of audit and non-audit 
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services (economies of scope). Vertical differentiation can apply to each of these audit 
characteristics individually as auditors may vary the delivered quality of any of these 
characteristics relative to their competitors.  
 With a set of quality measures in hand we provide the following hypotheses 
suggested by i) and ii), above. 
H1:  If high market share is indicative of auditor specialization and specialist auditors 
 choose to provide high levels of assurance then: bk+1> 0 in equation 1) and I is 
 positively correlated with ex post measures of audit quality.  
 
H1A:  If high market share is indicative of market power then: bk+1> 0 in equation 1) and 
 I is not positively correlated with ex post measures of audit quality.  
 
H2: If high market share is indicative of auditor specialization and specialist auditors 
 choose a cost leadership strategy then: bk+1 ≤ 0 in equation 1) and I is not positively 
 correlated with ex post measures of audit quality.  
 
 We can partially address iii), above, by dropping the a priori alignment of market 
share with specialization. To explore iii) first test whether auditor brand name is associated 
with a fee premium within industry and then test whether these designated specialists 
(labeled I) are associated with ex post measures of audit quality. This leads to our next 
hypothesis. 
 
H3: If bk+1 > 0 for an auditor in a given industry and if that auditor specializes in 
 providing high levels of assurance then I is correlated with ex post measures of audit 




H3 would also be useful in assessing the validity of our quality measures. One side benefit of 
the test proposed for H3 is that it suggests an associated hypothesis on the relationship 
between the product differentiation strategy and market share:  
This hypothesis addresses the implicit assumption in the literature that the demand for 
high quality audits is larger than the demand for lower quality audits. While this association 
appears to be true in the market for publicly held companies when we consider Big 4 and non 
Big 4 auditors, it is unknown whether it is it true for Big 4 specialists relative to other Big 4 
auditors. 
 




3. Data Selection and Variable Measurement  
Audit fee disclosures in the U.S. market began with proxy statements filed after 
February 5, 2001. We limit the study to fiscal year 2003 in order to obtain the largest cross-
section of firms while avoiding confounding issues related to the failure of Arthur Anderson 
in 2002 and the increased regulations associated with the Sarbanes Oxley Act. We start with 
6,535 client firms with audit fee data available from Standard and Poor’s. We drop client 
firms from the sample that are missing financial data from Compustat necessary to estimate 
the models. Finally, in order to reliably estimate the audit fee model parameters by industry, 
we focus our study on 2-digit SIC industries with at least 30 observations.  
One practical limitation on the assessment of auditor strategies is industry size. For 
small industries we believe it would be difficult if not impossible to reliably infer auditor 
strategy from market data. Shaked and Sutton (1982) use a duopoly model to demonstrate 
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conditions leading to a positive correlation between price competition and product 
differentiation. Specifically, they argue that firms in markets with intense price competition 
have greater incentives to differentiate their products than firms in markets facing less price 
competition. This suggests to us that industries with small numbers of client firms are 
unlikely to induce product differentiating investments by auditors7. As a consequence, we 
limit our tests to industries with large numbers of clients (at least 30 clients) where there is 
the potential for auditors to adopt either a product differentiation or cost leadership strategy. 
As an ancillary point we believe the question of market size and specialization needs further 
explication in the literature especially in those studies that define markets narrowly (such as a 
city8 as opposed to nationally). The concern, of course, is that for small markets the 
economic incentives to differentiate are reduced and the potential for oligopolistic behavior 
are increased. Both conditions argue against the identification of a price premium as 
indicative of product differentiation.  
                                                 
7 We have started from the assumption that auditors, like other businesses, choose a profit maximizing strategy 
that could generically be characterized as either product differentiation or cost leadership. Either strategy 
requires investment by the auditor. Specialization is determined by the extent of that investment. The choice of 
strategy depends upon, among other things: the size of the market, the strategies of existing entrants, and the 
demand for product diversity. Ceteris paribus we would expect auditors in larger markets to make greater 
investments than auditors in smaller markets, that auditors will normally choose to locate in product space away 
from other auditors in that market, and that the range of audit quality provided in a market would reflect the 
intrinsic demand for differentiated services. The consequence of these factors is that we do not expect all 
industry markets to be characterized by a similar equilibrium with respect to specialization strategy by 
participant firms. For instance, it is easy to imagine that in large industries all participant auditors have made 
specialist investments of one kind or another. Similarly, in a very small industry there could be only one or two 
participants, neither of which has made a significant investment.  
 
8 We have reservations about the use of this type of data to explore the concept of office or city specialization. 
One concern is that local markets may only incidentally be “local”.  By this we mean that the tendency for 
industries to agglomerate in geographic locations could be responsible for apparent local specialization. The 
unifying concept is that either specialization strategy requires investment. It is difficult for us to see why 
auditors would invest in geographic specialization outside of the desire to serve specific client needs that would 
coincide with industry specialization. This critique has the most force applied to publicly traded firms in single 
jurisdiction (say firms subject to SEC compliance) and would obviously be weakened for clients such as 




This results in a sample of 4,082 unique observations in 29 industries in our full 
sample and 3,450 observations for the sample that includes the more data-intensive measure 
of accrual quality and discretionary accruals.  Table 2 describes the selection criteria and the 
industry distribution of our sample.  
 We measure auditor industry specialization using the audit firm’s share of total audit 
fees within two-digit SIC code industries. We define specialists based on market share 
measures of the audit fees obtained by a given auditor. We classify an auditor as an industry 
specialist if the total audit fees obtained by the auditor are equal to, or greater than 20% of 
the total audit fees within an industry (Special20).9 
3.1 External reporting quality 
 One common way to measure audit quality is to base it on the quality of the client’s 
financial statements. We use two variables as proxies for the quality of a firm’s financial 
statements. The first is the absolute discretionary accruals derived from the firm’s financial 
statements. To determine discretionary accruals, we estimate the performance adjusted 
modified-Jones (1991) model as described by Kothari et al (2005). We use a cross-sectional 
sample to estimate the performance adjusted modified-Jones model using change in sales net 
of the change in accounts receivables [i.e., ∆SALESi,t - ∆ARi,t]. The regression model can be 
expressed in the following form (all variables are scaled by assets in yeart-1): 
 
TACCi,t = b0 + b11/ASSETSi,t-1 + b2 (∆SALESi,t - ∆ARi,t) + b3 PPEi,t + b4 NIi,t + e,t       (3) 
 
Where, 
                                                 
9 Ferguson and Stokes (2002) also define industry specialists based on 10% of the market share. They also 
investigate a continuous measure of specialization based on the proportion of fees obtained by the auditor 
within the industry. We restrict our analysis to the more restrictive definition of industry specialists in order to 
more precisely identify specialists. 
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TACCi,t  = (ΔCAi,t - ΔCLi,t - ΔCashi,t + ∆STDEBTi,t – DEPNi,t), firm i’s total  
accruals in year t.10  
ΔCAi,t = firm i’s change in current assets (Compustat item #4) between year t-1 
and year t. 
ΔCLi,t = firm i’s change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) between year t-1  
and year t. 
ΔCashi,t = firm i’s change in cash (Compustat #1) between year t-1 and year t. 
ΔSTDEBTi,t = firm i’s change in debt in current liabilities (Compustat item #34)  
between year t-1 and year t.  
DEPNi,t = firm i’s depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat #14)  
in year t.  
ASSETSi,t-1 = The book value of the firm’s assets in year (Compustat #6) t-1.  
∆SALESi,t = firm i’s change in revenues (Compustat item #12) between year t-1  
and year t. 
ΔARi,t = firm i’s change in accounts receivable (Compustat item #2)  
between year t-1 and year t. 
PPEi,t  = firm i’s gross value of PPE (Compustat #7) in year t.   
NIi,t  = firm i’s net income (Compustat item #172) in year t. 
 
We use the absolute value of the residuals from the estimate of cross-sectional 
industry regressions winsorized at the top and bottom 1% as our measure of discretionary 
accruals (DACC). Consistent with Balsam et al (2003), we conjecture that lower absolute 
discretionary accruals are consistent with higher quality financial reporting. 
 Our second measure of external financial reporting quality extends from the mapping 
of accruals into future cash flows. Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005) find a 
significant relation between their measure of accruals quality and the cost of equity and debt 
in a manner that is consistent with a positive relation between accruals quality and the quality 
of external reporting. Following Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis, LaFond, Olsson, 
and Schipper (2005) we measure accruals quality (Acc_Q) as the standard deviation of the 
residuals from annual regressions relating current accruals to cash flows. Specifically, we 
estimate a model of working capital accruals on cash flow from operations in the prior 
                                                 
10 We also estimate the model measuring total accruals with the cash-flow method (TACC = income before 
extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations) as suggested by Collins and Hribar (2002) and find 
similar results. We use the balance-sheet method in our primary tests to be consistent with prior research. 
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period, current period, and future period. We also augment the model with fundamental 
variables from the modified Jones (1991) model; property plant and equipment and change in 
revenues.  This leads to the following regression model (all variables are scaled by average 
total assets): 
TCAi,t = d0 + d1 CFOi,t-1 + d2 CFOi,t + d3 CFOi,t+1 + d4 ΔRevi,t + d5 PPEi,t + εi,t (4) 
 
Where, 
TCAi,t  = ΔCAi,t - ΔCLi,t - ΔCashi,t + STDEBTi,t, total current accruals in year t.  
CFOi,t  = NIBEi,t – TACCi,t, firm i’s cash flow from operation in year t.  
NIBEi,t  = firm i’s net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18)  
in year t. 
ΔRevi,t  = firm i’s change in revenues (Compustat item #12) between year t-1  
and year t.  
PPEi,t  = firm i’s gross value of PPE (Compusta #7) in year t.   
  
Cross-sectional annual estimations of equation (4) by industry yield firm-year specific 
residuals. The standard deviation of firm i’s residuals calculated over years t-4 through t 
represents the accruals quality (Acc_Q). Once again, in order to reduce the impact of outliers 
on the results we winsorize the accrual quality measures at the top and bottom 1%. The 
accrual quality model is predicated on the idea that accrual quality is affected by the 
measurement error in accruals. The unexplained portion of the variation in working capital 
accruals (the residual) is an inverse measure of accruals quality. Thereby larger standard 
deviations indicate poorer accruals quality. Similar to Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 
(2005), we conjecture that poorer accrual quality (a higher value of Acc_Q) implies poorer 
quality financial reporting.  
 Table 3 provides DACC and Acc_Q summary statistics for the full sample, clients of 
Big 4 auditors, and clients of industry specialist auditors. The evidence is mixed as to the 
difference between the level of absolute discretionary accruals and the accrual quality for 
firms audited by specialist and Big 4 auditors. The sample of firms audited by specialists 
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exhibit lower absolute discretionary accruals and improved accrual quality (lower values of 
DACC and Acc_Q) than the full sample of firms. However, there is not a significant 
difference between the accrual quality and discretionary accruals of specialist and Big 4 
clients.11  
3.2 Market share and Auditor Fee Premiums 
 As noted earlier we identify auditors that obtain a 20% or greater industry market 
share as potential specialists. To test whether these auditors receive a fee premium we use an 
indicator variable, Special20, in various audit fee regressions. The audit fee model controls 
for client specific differences in factors that are likely to influence fees such as audit size, 
audit complexity, and auditor-auditee risk sharing (see for example Simunic 1980; Francis 
1984; Francis and Stokes 1986; Craswell et al 1995; Ferguson and Stokes 2002). We 
estimate the following audit fee model by industry to determine the industry-specific 
specialist pricing effect:  
Ln(fee)  = β0 + β1 Ln(assets) + β2 CATA + β3 DE + β4 ROI + β5 Foreign  
 + β6 Special Items + β7 YE + β8 Segments + β9 Special20  
 + β10 Big 4+ e 
(5) 
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
 
We use a number of versions of this model specification. In addition to estimating the 
model by industry we also pool observations and estimate the model for the full sample, a 
sample restricted to Big 4 clients, and a sample in which two industries with dominant 
auditors as identified in the industry level regressions are excluded. A further variation on 
this model is estimated by industry with an auditor specific indicator variable. This latter 
model provides us with information on auditor-specific pricing strategies within an industry.  
                                                 
11 Tests of differences in means (medians) across sample are based on t-tests (Wilcoxian rank-sum tests). 
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3.3 Tests of audit quality  
External reporting quality is only one characteristic of an audit. We also use the 
provision of non-audit services (NAS) as a measure of economies of scope that may cause a 
client to choose a specialist or fee-premium specialist auditor without an increase in the 
quality of the external reports.  We note that various studies have found a positive relation 
between audit fees and non-audit service fees (e.g., Simunic 1980; O’Keefe et al 1994).12  In 
addition we include the occurrence of restatements, If Restated, as a measure of quality 
financial reports.13  Because we wish to investigate the relation between auditor 
specialization and aggregate quality, we test our quality measures by using a logit model to 
predict if client firms are audited by specialists. This methodology allows us to include all 
four measures of audit quality in a single equation, which we believe to be a richer 
analysis.14  To test these associations we estimate the following model: 
                                                




4.1 Hypotheses 1 and 1A 
The auditor specialization hypothesis, H1, requires that auditors designated as high 
quality auditors receive a fee premium and provide a higher quality audit service. Since it has 
been conjectured in the literature that a high industry market share indicates a high quality 
audit specialist then H1 requires the following set of characteristics to occur together, 
 
12 Whisenant et al (2003) provide evidence that this finding could be due to failure to control for endogeneity. 
13 We recognize that restatements may occur for a variety of reasons of which poor accounting quality is only 
one cause. As such, if income is restated due to accounting changes, If Restated measures audit quality with 
error. However, because it is one of many measures of audit quality, we believe it is an important variable to 
include in the analysis. 
14 We also test the quality metrics independently as a function of specialization, market share, and fee premiums 
(see table 8) and an aggregate measure (Table 9). We find results that are qualitatively consistent with the 
results of the estimation presented in equation 6. 
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{Special20 = 1, ∂Audit Fee/∂Special20 = bSpecial20 > 0, corr(Special20, audit quality) ≠ 0}. 
Tables 4 and 5 report on the fee premium obtained by Special20 auditors. Table 4 indicates 
that a Special20 auditor obtains a statistically significant fee premium in only 2 of our 29 
industry-level regressions.  
In Table 5 the data is pooled across industries and includes industry fixed effects. 
Interestingly, the extent of a fee premium in the pooled data depends upon the sample 
definition. In column 1 we use the full sample including the clients of non Big 4 auditors. In 
this sample, a Special20 fee premium of 14% (t-value = 4.69) is reported. Since all of the 
Special20 auditors in our sample are Big 4 firms we believe it is reasonable to argue that 
specialization, as measured by the Special20 metric, is a property of Big 4 auditors. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to limit the pricing model to clients of the Big 4. Following up on 
this insight in column 2 we exclude non Big 4 clients from the sample. As can be seen the 
Special20 fee premium falls to 7.1% (t-value = 2.32).15 As noted in Table 4 only two 
industries exhibit significant Special20 fee premiums. In column 3 we exclude these 
industries and, once again, the Special20 fee premium falls, now to 5% and is only 
marginally significant (t-value = 1.71). This result is depicted in Figure 1 where a lowess (or 
loess) smooth of Special20 against fees adjusted for the controls in equation (5) is presented 
for the various samples16. The lowess smooths plot Special20 against the residual from a fee 
                                                 
15 Note that we include an indicator variable in the pooled regression for clients of the Big 4 auditors. 
Interestingly, when we restrict the analysis to clients of Big 4 auditors and suppress the indicator, the coefficient 
on Special20 declines in value and significance suggesting that the audit fee model is different for clients of Big 
4 auditors, and this difference is not captured by the Big 4 indicator in the pooled sample. 
16 Lowess (or loess) smoothing is a method that relies upon locally weighted regressions, see Cleveland (1993), 
to graphically depict the relationship between two variables. Essentially, a series of regressions are run of the 
dependent variable on the independent variable in which a) a local subset of the independent variables are used 
and b) weightings are applied to the independent variables so as to highlight the effect of local values of the 
independent variable. From these regressions predicted values of the dependent value are plotted for each value 
of the independent variable. The benefit of this approach is that it does not impose linearity as would be the case 
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regression (equation 5) that excludes Special20 for each of the three samples. As can be seen 
from both Table 4 and Figure 1 the relationship between fees and Special20 firms is not a 
pervasive phenomenon in U.S. audit markets. This fact alone casts doubt on the reliability of 
using market share statistics to identify industry specialists. 
 In Table 7 we test the association of Special20 with our measures of audit quality. In 
columns 1 and 2 we use the full sample and Big 4 only samples. We do not find evidence of 
strong associations between Special20 and audit quality in either sample. Only one measure 
Ln(NAS) appears to be significantly associated with Special20. We conclude that H1 is not 
supported in our sample. Rather, to the extent that a Special20 fee premium is supported by 
the pooled tests in Table 5 the evidence is consistent with H1A, i.e., auditors with high-
market shares exert market power. 
4.2 Hypothesis 2 
 An examination of Table 4 does not reveal any industries in which Special20 is 
associated with fee discounting, on average. However, industry 49 (electric, gas, and sanitary 
services) is marginally significant (t-value = -1.70). Fee discounting could occur if specialist 
auditors adopted a cost leadership strategy. In Table 6 we report the results of individual 
auditor within industry regressions. This reveals that in a number of industries individual Big 
4 auditors appear to be discounting relative to other Big 4 firms. We label these discounters 
Neg Fee firms and in Table 7 (column 4) check for an association of these firms with our 
measures of audit quality. Fee discounters provide more NAS (t-value = 5.69) and, 
surprisingly, marginally greater accruals quality (t-value = -1.76). However, we would view 
the evidence that they provide a quality differentiated product as relatively weak. In 
                                                                                                                                                       




aggregate, these results provide evidence that some auditors may be pursuing cost leadership 
strategies. 
4.3 Hypothesis 3 
 Hypothesis 3 is related to Hypothesis 1, but differs in that we test the fees and audit 
quality of each auditor independently without restricting the analysis to specialists as 
identified by market share. Here we test for an association between a positive industry fee 
premium and evidence of higher audit quality by auditor. Since we do not use market share 
to identify potential specialists in this model, we refer to the individual auditor by industry. 
Table 6 presents results from estimations used to identify auditors with statistically 
significant (t-values > 1.9) industry fee premiums. These auditors are labeled as Prem Fee 
auditors. Using the audit quality tests presented in equation (6) we test for associations 
between Prem Fee and our measures of audit quality and present the results in column 6 of 
Table 7. We find mixed evidence on the relation between fee premiums and audit quality. 
The Prem Fee auditors are associated with lower accruals quality variance (t-value = -3.42) 
an indication of higher audit quality. At the same time, clients of auditors that earn fee 
premiums exhibit higher absolute discretionary accruals (t-value = 4.02) an indication of 
lower audit quality. This split decision suggests to us a similar conclusion as was drawn 
above, that the evidence for quality differentiated services as an explanation for fee 
premiums among the set of Big 4 auditors is not supported in our sample. 
 The results of estimation equation (6) allow us to test for the association between 
various measures of audit quality and auditor specialization in a single equation. However, 
our measures of quality are correlated as can be seen in Table 3 Panel B. To address this 
issue, we estimate the model in a more traditional framework in which the dependent 
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variable is the quality metric and the independent variable is the measure of auditor 
specialization. We restrict the sample to clients of Big 4 auditors to reduce the impact of Big 
4 on the results and we include several controls to allow for the effect of size and possible 
financial distress on audit quality.17 
Quality  = β0 + β1 Ln(assets) + β2 Ln(NAS) + β3 Loss + β4 DE + β5 Quick+ β6 TACC +  
      β7 Auditor-type  + e 
(7) 
 
The results, reported in Table 8, do not provide support for the hypothesis that 
specialist auditors provide higher quality audits across dimensions of discretionary accruals, 
accrual quality, or restatements. We find weak evidence (t-value = 1.80) that auditors holding 
at least 20% of the market share earn greater non-audit service fees. In unreported results, we 
also estimate equation (7) identifying auditors that earn fee premiums. Again, we do not find 
evidence that clients of premium auditors exhibit higher quality financial reporting. We 
repeat the analysis with the continuous measure of market share and find qualitatively similar 
results. 
We recognize that our proxies for audit quality are measured with error. As such, 
testing our hypothesis on any single measure of audit quality may lead to incomplete 
conclusions because the test lacks power. This is particularly important if our measures of 
audit quality capture different dimensions of financial reporting quality. To address this 
issue, we focus on aggregate reporting quality and create a composite measure of reporting 
quality based on discretionary accruals, accrual quality, and restatements. To construct this 
composite measure of total quality TQ we rank-order Acc_Q and DACC from smallest to 
                                                 
17 When we expand the sample to include all firms, and include a Big 4 indicator, the coefficients on Special20 
and Mkt Share are negative and significant, indicating that clients of Big 4 specialists auditors (high market-
share auditors) exhibit better quality financial reporting than firms that are not clients of non-Big 4 auditors. 
While this is an interesting result, the focus of this study is on distinguishing audit quality of specialist auditors, 
which is generally limited to a peer group of Big 4 clients. In support of this conjecture, we illustrate in Table 5 
that the specialist premium when restricting the analysis to clients of Big 4 auditors differs from the full sample. 
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largest. We then normalize the rankings on a scale of 0 (smallest) to 1 (largest) such that the 
median value has the scaled rank of 0.50. Since If NI restated is an indicator variable a value 
of .5 was assigned if a restatement occurred and 0 otherwise.  We then aggregate the scaled 
ranks for each observation to generate an composite measure, TQ. Since high discretionary 
accruals, high values of Acc_Q and restatements indicate low quality financial reporting, low 
values of TQ indicate high quality auditing (earnings) and, conversely, high values of TQ 
indicate low quality auditing (earnings). We then used TQ as a dependent variable to test 
whether Special20, Market Share, or Premium Auditors have an effect on audit quality. 
We report the results from this estimation in table 9. The results indicate that the 
proxy variables Special20, Premium Auditors, and Mkt Share are not associated with higher 
audit quality. Premium auditors do not appear to provide higher quality than other Big 4 
auditors. Interestingly firms with lower quality auditing (earnings) are smaller, purchase 
more NAS from Big 4 clients, pay higher audit fees, are more likely to have a loss, have 
more debt, and fewer quick assets. 
 
4.4 Hypothesis 4 
 Implicit in the auditor specialization hypothesis is the assumption that high quality 
auditors obtain larger market shares in each industry. In Table 8 we look cross-sectionally at 
the relationship between our audit quality measures and Special20 and Mkt Share. We only 
find one significant association between ACC_Q and Mkt Share, however we do not find a 
similar association between ACC_Q and Special20. In all other cases we find no evidence 
that audit quality is associated with greater market shares, on average, a result inconsistent 




5.0  Conclusions  
 The purpose of this study has been to investigate auditor market shares, pricing, and 
audit quality. Economic theory suggests that the demand for higher quality audits may lead 
specialist audit firms to provide higher quality audits at increased fees. In contrast, some 
specialist auditors may provide a non-differentiated product at discounted fees or provide 
higher quality audits at the “market rate”. In our primary tests we compare the audit quality 
of auditors with large market shares to other auditors.  
Our empirical results, based on U.S. companies in fiscal year 2003, are not consistent 
with the interpretation that high-market share auditors are specialists providing higher quality 
audits than non-specialists. Further, we find little evidence of differential audit quality within 
Big 4 auditors regardless of market share and/or pricing strategy. On balance our evidence is 
consistent with Big 4 auditors pursuing varying pricing strategies and, in some industries, 
using a dominant market share position to earn higher fees. 
 While our evidence argues against the use of industry market shares to proxy for 
industry specialization, we rely upon the use of various proxies for audit quality. These 
proxies provide the most serious limitations of this study. Other concerns could be raised 
regarding the definition of specialist as one with a minimum 20% market share and perhaps 
even our industry definitions. All researchers in this area face similar issues and each concern 
could be a study in itself, though, our choices in these matters are prevalent in both auditing 
and other areas of accounting literature. 
 In our opinion the questions of auditor specialization and auditor pricing remain open 
and likely will remain unresolved as long as researchers have limited access to cost data and 
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more precise quality data. Better models of auditor investment strategies would also 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Units Definition (Source) 
Ln(fee)  Dollars The natural log of the auditor fees identified to be related 
directly to audit services (S&P). 
Ln(assets)  Dollars The natural log of the book value of the firm’s assets 
(COMPUSTAT). 
CATA  Ratio The current assets of the firm scaled by the total assets reported 
by the firm (COMPUSTAT). 
DE  Ratio Ratio of long-term liabilities to total assets (COMPUSTAT). 
 
ROI  Ratio The before tax income of the firms scaled by the total assets 
(COMPUSTAT). 
YE  0,1 An indicator variable if the fiscal year-end is not 12/31, zero 
otherwise (COMPUSTAT). 
Loss  0,1 An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a net operating 
loss in any of the past three years, zero otherwise 
(COMPUSTAT). 
Big  0,1 An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is one of 
Big 4, zero otherwise (COMPUSTAT). 
Foreign  0,1 An indicator variable equal to one if the firm reports a foreign 
currency adjustment, zero otherwise (COMPUSTAT). 
Special Items  0,1 An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm reports special items, 
zero otherwise (COMPUSTAT). 
If Restated 0,1 Indicator variable if net income was restated. (COMPUSTAT) 
Ln(Nas) Dollars The non-audit fees scaled by the sum of the audit and non-audit 
fees (S&P and CoreData). 
DACC Continuous Absolute value of the residual from the predicted accruals model 
(COMPUSTAT) 
Acc_Q Continuous Accruals Quality as defined in Francis et al., (2005) 
(COMPUSTAT) 
Mkt Share Continuous Auditor industry market share based on audit fees 
Special20 0,1 An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor holds at 
least 20% of the market share, zero otherwise (S&P). 
Neg   Fee 0,1 An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor received a 
statistically significant (|t-val.| >1.9) negative fee in that industry 
Prem Fee 0,1 An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor received a 






Table 2: Selection and Distribution of the Sample 
Panel A: Sample selection 
S&P observations with audit fees (fiscal year 2003) 6,525 
Less:  
Companies unavailable on Compustat 574 
Missing Compustat data 1,495 
Less than 30 observations per two-digit SIC industry code 384 
Sample Size  4072 
Less:  
Missing Compustat data required to measure Accrual Quality* 625 
Restricted Sample Size 3,447 
  
Panel B: Distribution of observations by industry 
SIC2 Description (OSHA) N-full sample N-restricted sample
10 Agricultural Products 39 25 
13 Oil and Gas 158 130 
20 Food and Kindred Products 103 93 
23 Apparel and Finished Goods 47 41 
26 Paper and Allied Products 38 35 
27 Printing  and Publishing 59 54 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 492 387 
30 Rubber and Plastics 52 45 
33 Primary Metal 59 50 
34 Fabricated Metal 59 56 
35 Commercial Machinery 298 264 
36 Electrical Equipment 420 370 
37 Transportation Equipment 94 79 
38 Measurement Instruments 367 314 
39 Manufacturing Industries 36 35 
42 Freight/Transportation 33 27 
45 Air Transportation 30 25 
48 Communications 158 128 
49 Electric, Gas, Sanitary Services 159 146 
50 Durable Goods-Wholesale 120 104 
51 Nondurable Goods-Wholesale 57 51 
56 Apparel Retail Stores 52 45 
58 Eating and Drinking Places 79 70 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 97 75 
67 Investment Offices 38 26 
73 Business Services 670 553 
79 Amusement and Recreation 52 42 
80 Health Services 85 73 
87 Engineering/Management Services 121 104 
Total  4,072 3,447 
 
Audit fees are obtained from the Standard and Poor’s database for fiscal year 2003.   
Firm-level characteristics are obtained from Compustat annual files.  




Table 3 Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Mean and Median Firm Characteristics by Sample 
  Full Sample Big 4 Specialist 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Ln(fee)  5.801 5.710 6.203 6.073 6.314 6.199 
Ln(assets)  4.950 4.935 5.707 5.637 5.825 5.750 
CATA  3.320 2.019 3.475 2.132 3.173 2.067 
DE  0.295 0.082 0.185 0.103 0.182 0.104 
ROI  -0.300 0.019 -0.059 0.030 -0.050 0.033 
Loss  0.668 1.000 0.622 1.000 0.606 1.000 
Foreign  0.195 0.000 0.223 0.000 0.233 0.000 
Special Items  0.605 1.000 0.643 1.000 0.664 1.000 
Segments 1.336 1.000 1.373 1.000 1.395 1.000 
Special20 0.494 0.000 0.647 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Ln(Nas) 3.864 4.032 4.371 4.566 4.518 4.732 
DACC 0.139 0.001 0.014 0.001 0.013 0.001 
Acc_Q 0.144 0.088 0.116 0.076 0.114 0.077 
Full sample is 4,072, Big N sample is 3,119, Specialist sample is 2,018. Observations for DACC and Acc_Q are 
restricted to 3,447 observations due to data restrictions required to measure these variables. 
Variables are as defined in Table 1.  
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Panel B: Correlation Matrix of the Full Sample 
 Ln(fee)  Ln(assets) CATA  DE  ROI  Loss  Foreign Special Items Segments Special20 Ln(Nas) DACC 
Ln(fee)  1.000            
Ln(assets)  0.851 1.000           
CATA  -0.102 -0.065 1.000          
DE  -0.032 -0.081 -0.010 1.000         
ROI  0.097 0.188 0.013 -0.931 1.000        
Loss  -0.195 -0.357 0.041 0.015 -0.075 1.000       
Foreign  0.251 0.181 -0.025 0.034 -0.012 -0.008 1.000      
Special Items  0.334 0.260 -0.066 -0.019 0.028 0.134 0.147 1.000     
Segments 0.409 0.394 -0.082 -0.011 0.047 -0.167 0.098 0.122 1.000    
Special20 0.363 0.351 -0.019 -0.019 0.053 -0.127 0.100 0.121 0.128 1.000   
Ln(Nas) 0.687 0.636 -0.054 -0.032 0.091 -0.187 0.234 0.244 0.307 0.284 1.000  
DACC -0.193 -0.262 -0.009 0.236 -0.348 0.084 -0.035 -0.048 -0.081 -0.110 -0.146 1.000 
Acc_Q -0.257 -0.421 -0.014 0.034 -0.156 0.244 -0.046 -0.024 -0.145 -0.162 -0.233 0.370 
 
 
Full sample is 4,072. Observations for DACC and Acc_Q are restricted to 3,447 observations due to data restrictions required to measure these variables. 
Variables are as defined in Table 1.  
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Table 4: Audit fee model by industry for fiscal year 2003 
Ln(fee)  =  β0 + β1 Ln(assets) + β2 CATA + β3 DE + β4 ROI + β5 Foreign + β6 Special 
Items + β7 YE + β8 Segments + β9 Special20 + β10 Big + e 
 
Two-digit SIC Special20 Robust SE t-value N Adj. R2 
10 -0.13 0.26 -0.49 39 0.89 
13 0.446 0.15 2.95 158 0.77 
20 0.405 0.38 1.08 103 0.72 
23 0.374 0.17 2.26 47 0.87 
26 -0.181 0.29 -0.62 38 0.83 
27 0.308 0.19 1.63 59 0.81 
28 0.09 0.06 1.45 492 0.80 
30 0.018 0.42 0.04 52 0.38 
33 -0.134 0.20 -0.67 59 0.84 
34 0.101 0.11 0.89 59 0.89 
35 0.006 0.08 0.08 298 0.79 
36 -0.035 0.08 -0.45 420 0.71 
37 0.076 0.26 0.30 94 0.89 
38 0.025 0.06 0.40 367 0.81 
39 0.209 0.30 0.69 36 0.88 
42 0.002 0.21 0.01 33 0.68 
45 -0.056 0.23 -0.24 30 0.78 
48 0.311 0.24 1.31 158 0.67 
49 -0.244 0.14 -1.70 159 0.84 
50 -0.015 0.12 -0.12 120 0.84 
51 0.08 0.16 0.50 57 0.84 
56 0.03 0.15 0.20 52 0.78 
58 -0.044 0.17 -0.27 79 0.66 
59 -0.002 0.15 -0.01 97 0.73 
67 0.025 0.47 0.05 38 0.68 
73 0.09 0.07 1.25 670 0.74 
79 0.147 0.21 0.69 52 0.75 
80 0.501 0.32 1.58 85 0.49 
87 -0.129 0.15 -0.86 121 0.74 
Results are from industry-specific regressions based on two-digit SIC. For parsimony, we only report the 
coefficients and statistics related to the Special20 variable, all variables are as defined in Table 1. Robust SE are 
are Huber-White robust standard errors on the Special20 coefficient. N is the number of observations in the 






Table 5: Pooled audit fee model for fiscal year 2003 
Ln(fee)  =  β0 + β1 Ln(assets) + β2 CATA + β3 DE + β4 ROI + β5 Foreign + β6 Special 
Items + β7 YE + β8 Segments + β9 Special20 + β10 Big + e 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full Sample Big 4 Restricted 





Adj. R2 0.762 0.699 0.696 
N 4,072 3,119 2,914 
Coefficients and (t-values) are provided. Industry fixed effects are included. For parsimony, we only report the 
coefficients and statistics related to the Special20 variable, all variables are as defined in Table 1. Standard 
errors are Huber-White robust and cluster-adjusted by industry. Column (1) includes the full sample including 
Non-big 4 firms. Column (2) is restricted to Big 4 clients and restricts Big from the model. Column (3) is 





Table 6: Audit fee model for individual Big 4 auditors by industry for fiscal year 2003 
Ln(fee)  =  β0 + β1 Ln(assets) + β2 CATA + β3 DE + β4 ROI + β5 Foreign + β6 Special 
Items + β7 YE + β8 Segments + β9 Auditor + e 
 
 DT EY KPMG PW 
SIC 2 t-value MKT SH t-value MKT SH t-value MKT SH t-value MKT SH 
10 1.83 9% 0.52 22% -1.02 15% -0.35 49% 
13* -1.98 6% -0.87 17% -0.39 16% 2.86 56% 
20 0.49 15% 1.49 32% -1.34 18% 0.01 33% 
23* 1.38 49% 0.02 16% -0.70 6% -1.30 17% 
26 -0.05 28% -0.56 24% 0.54 13% 0.17 35% 
27 0.33 21% -0.02 23% 1.42 42% -2.07 12% 
28 0.14 21% 0.45 19% -2.21 16% 1.24 41% 
30 0.78 11% 1.05 46% -0.06 13% -1.18 25% 
33 0.41 12% 0.89 25% 0.09 9% -1.38 53% 
34 -1.02 19% -0.27 17% 0.62 17% 0.70 44% 
35 0.65 18% -0.66 24% -0.45 12% 0.72 42% 
36 0.95 30% -0.14 24% 0.47 20% -0.92 23% 
37 -2.10 34% 1.24 28% -0.29 8% 1.35 30% 
38 0.29 15% -0.89 25% -0.77 11% 1.18 44% 
39 0.36 31% 0.00 15% -0.32 20% -0.06 27% 
42 0.63 34% 0.19 7% -0.35 33% -0.72 24% 
45 -2.53 21% 2.02 63% 0.24 17% (no observations) 
48 -1.27 3% 1.09 82% 0.08 8% 0.16 6% 
49 -0.20 46% 2.17 12% 0.12 9% -1.27 33% 
50 1.69 15% -0.02 34% -1.63 15% -0.23 24% 
51 -0.54 28% 0.82 45% -1.45 14% 1.15 11% 
56 0.25 38% -0.03 25% 0.91 15% -1.47 17% 
58 1.39 15% 0.89 26% -0.93 46% -1.24 9% 
59 -1.09 27% 0.21 16% 0.40 28% 0.71 24% 
67 1.10 18% -0.75 38% 0.59 22% -0.40 20% 
73 -1.15 16% 1.02 22% 1.22 24% -1.42 33% 
79 -1.28 37% 2.45 30% -1.51 7% -0.27 15% 
80 -0.04 6% 2.38 50% -0.04 26% -1.29 14% 
87 1.00 17% -0.71 30% -0.01 22% -0.20 25% 
 * Industries in which a fee premium is identified on Special20 in Table 4.  
Results are from industry-specific regressions including an auditor indicator variable, Auditor representing each 
of the Big 4 auditors (DT, EY. KPMG, and PW). For parsimony, we only report the coefficients and statistics 
related to the each auditor, all variables are as defined in Table 1. Standard errors are Huber-White robust. 




Table 7: Tobit Estimation of Auditor type on Audit Quality 
Specialist  = α0 + α1 ACC_Q + α2 DACC + α3 If Restated + α4 Ln(Nas) + α5 Ln(Assets) +  e 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sample Full Big 4 SIC 13 & 23 Big 4 Big 4 
Dependent Variable Special20 Special20 Special20 Neg Fee Prem  Fee 




(0.237) (-1.77) (-1.76) (-3.42) 




(2.01) (-0.684) (4.02) 




(2.09) (1.63) (1.24) 




(1.97) (5.61) (-0.498) 




(-0.493) (-0.282) (0.952) 




(-0.981) (-5.69) (-3.35) 
Chi-square 224.263 38.468 . 289.928 39.146 
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.009 0.093 0.092 0.075 
N 3,447 2,691 116 2,691 2,691 
Coefficients and (t-values) are reported. 
Variables are as defined in Table 1. The dependent variable in columns 1, 2, and 3 is Special20. The dependent 
variable in column 4 (column 5) is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is a client of an auditor with a 
significantly negative (positive) coefficient in the pricing model reported in Table 6. The model is estimated on 
the full sample in column 1, restricted to clients of the Big 4 in columns 2, 4, and 5, and restricted to industries 
13 and 23 in column 3. Independent variables are as defined in Table 1.
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Table 8: Estimation of audit quality measures on market share variables 
Audit Quality =  β0 + β1 Ln(assets) + β2 Ln(NAS) + β3 Loss + β4 DE + β5 Quick+ β6 TACC  + β7 Auditor-type  + e 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable DACC Acc_Q If Restate Ln(NAS) DACC Acc_Q If Restate Ln(NAS) 
Ln(assets) -0.013 -0.02 0.078 0.607 -0.013 -0.019 0.073 0.607 
  (-2.02) (-5.70) (1.71) 
 
(16.55) (-2.03) (-5.72) (1.59) (16.42) 
Loss 0.001 0.038 -0.032 0.295 0.001 0.038 -0.029 0.294 
  
(0.26) (4.23) (-0.18) 
 
(1.85) (0.30) (4.15) (-0.16) (1.83) 
DE 0.005 0.012 0.029 -0.095 0.005 0.012 0.021 -0.106 
  
(0.84) (1.04) (0.20) 
 
(-0.42) (0.80) (1.02) (0.13) (-0.46) 
Quick 0.000 0.000 -0.108 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.107 -0.003 
  
(-1.08) (-1.76) (-1.51) 
 
(-1.56) (-1.10) (-1.75) (-1.51) (-1.74) 
TACC 0.014 0.054 0.063 -0.081 0.013 0.053 0.06 -0.098 
  
(0.47) (3.34) (0.21) 
 
(-0.73) (0.46) (3.15) (0.21) (-0.83) 
Special20 0.002 0.007 0.067 0.226     
  
(0.72) (0.67) (0.46) 
 
(1.80)     
Mkt Share     0.013 -0.039 0.562 0.356 
  
   
 
 (1.52) (-2.55) (1.12) (1.14) 
Intercept 0.087 0.202 -1.964 0.652 0.086 0.214 -2.043 0.707 
  
(2.02) (7.01) (-4.07) 
 
(3.11) (2.01) (6.63) (-4.22) (3.46) 
N 2760 2691 2760 2760 2760 2691 2760 2760 
Adj. R-square 0.033 0.141  0.324 0.033 0.141  0.322 
Pseudo R-square   0.017    0.018  
Coefficients and (t-values) are reported. 




Table 9: Estimation of aggregate audit quality metric on measures of industry 
specialization, premium audit fees, and market share 
TQ =  β0 + β1 Ln(assets) + β2 Ln(NAS) + β3 Loss + β4 DE + β5 Quick+ β6 TACC  
+ β7 Auditor-type  + e 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Ln(assets) -0.153 -0.152 -0.152 
   (-22.72) 
 
 (-23.40)  (-24.17) 
Ln(NAS) 0.022 0.022 0.022 
  (3.52) 
 
(3.67) (3.68) 









 (-1.27)  (-1.26) 




 (-0.02)  (-0.02) 














 (-1.32)  




  (-1.64) 





N 2691 2691 2691 
Adj. R-square 0.462 0.463 0.463 
The dependent variable is the TQ is a composite measure of accruals quality, absolute discretionary accruals 
and restatement based on the sum of the distributional ranking for each component within the sample. The 
variables Acc_Q and DACC are ordered from smallest to largest and then assigned a ranking. The rankings are 
then scaled from 0 (smallest) to 1.0 (largest). The median value has the scaled rank of .50. Since If NI restated 
is an indicator variable a value of .5 was assigned if a restatement occurred and 0 otherwise. The scaled ranks 
were summed for each observation to form TQ. Low values of TQ indicate high quality auditing (earnings) and, 
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